Showing posts with label recency bias. Show all posts
Showing posts with label recency bias. Show all posts

Saturday 26 October 2019

iCapital.Biz Berhad price chart since listing




iCapital.biz performance over the last 14 years

iCapital.biz was listed at the end of 2005 with a NAV of around RM 1.00.

On 24th October, 2019, its NAV was RM 3.21 and its share price on 25th October, 2019 was 2.42 per share.

Over the last 14 years, it gave 1 dividend of 9 sen per share.

Over the course of the last 14 years your investment in icapital.biz grew from $1.00 to $3.30, its compound annual growth rate, or its overall return, is 8.90%.


Share price fluctuations of iCapital.biz over the last 14 years

iCapital.biz traded at a premium to its NAV in its early years of listing. It was trading at high price of RM 2.48 in the early days of January 2008.

Its price crashed with the Global Financial Crisis. The premium to its NAV disappeared and it was trading at a huge discount to its NAV when its share price crashed to 1.06 in October 2009.

Since then, its share price has climbed upwards steadily over the years and always trading at a discount to its NAV.

On 25.10.2019, icapital.biz is priced at RM 2.42 per share.



So, who are the winners or losers in this stock?

The initial shareholders who hold onto to their shares until today from listing are obvious winners.

The buyers of this stock in and around January 2008 were obvious losers. They would have bought at very high prices and at huge premium to its NAV too.

However, for those who held onto this stock even when bought in January 2008 for the long term and who continued with a dollar cost averaging strategy over the years, they might still be winners overall.  This requires discipline and a firm investing philosophy.

Those who bought into icapital.biz from October 2008 when its price was the lowest and at any time subsequently and held till today are also winners, provided they bought below 2.42 per share.

Yes, there are obvious winners in this stock but they have to be in this stock long term and have done continuous buying of the stock over time (dollar cost averaging) when the price was obviously not too high.



Are there more winners or losers in this stock?

I believe the majority of players in the stock market are short-term traders. As traders, they are in at the time when the stock enjoys some popularity and they are out when the stock appears disfavoured. 

Thus, they are likely to be in the stock at the time when the prices were high and out when the prices dropped; they bought high and sold low.

I think icapital.biz is no different from other stocks in the Bursa. Though over the long term, icapital.biz has delivered positive returns, for those who have bought and sold icapital.biz stocks over the years, on an aggregate, there were more losers than winners.


The risk in investing is not the stock.  It is the person staring back at you in the mirror:  YOURSELF.




Suggested further reading:
https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-party-effect-or-recency-bias.html
No One is Immune from The Party Effect or Recency Bias









Wednesday 3 April 2019

No One is Immune from The Party Effect or Recency Bias

What is the Recency Bias?

When describing the stock market each participant sees their portfolio’s performance 
  • from their perspective only and 
  • thus they are always “right”.
This leads to what I call The Party Effect or what Financial Behaviorist call the Recency Bias.



An illustration


Historical average rate of return is 12%.  What does this imply? Would everyone have the same rate of return?


Imagine that you attended a party hosted by your investment advisor and that in addition to you, also in attendance were several other clients. As you go around the room and meet people you learn that everyone at the party owns the exact same S&P 500 index mutual fund. I use the S&P 500 for this tale because by many measures it has historically produce an average rate of return of about 12% and as many people know, and now you know as well, it represents what many investors call “the stock market.” 


The question then is would everyone have the same rate of return at this party? 
  • Of course the answer is, no they would not. 
  • If they started at the same time they would but since people invest or come into the life of the investment advisor at different times, the answer is no.

A party with only 30 guests, specially selected for illustration.


Let’s tighten up the party attendee list and invite only 30 guests. For simplicity, let’s assume that Guest 1 purchased the fund 30 months ago, that Guest 2 purchased it 29 months ago, that Guest 3 purchased it 28 months ago, etc. 

What would the guests discuss? What would be their perspectives of the stock market?  In order to determine what the guests would discuss and how they would evaluate their performance we need to have some data in the form of monthly rates of return. So we need to develop a monthly rate of return for 30 months to see what they see. 



A 30-month cycle: 18 months bull market phase and 12 months bear market phase 



Again, for simplicity, assume that for the first 18 months the fund goes up 3% per month and for the next 12 months it goes down 2% per month. 

  • Please note that I didn’t pick this sequence of numbers randomly. I have a purpose to this. 
  • This particular sequence approximates how the stock market moves in terms of bull and bear market duration and after 30 months returns approximately 12%; 12.28% to be exact. 
  • This sequence of numbers is a good sequence to illustrate The Party Effect or Recency Bias. 
  • We can characterize the first 18 months as the bull market phase of the 30-month cycle and the last 12 months as the bear market phase of the 30-month cycle.


Focus on 4 guests (1, 10, 19 and 25) to illustrate the Party Effect


To illustrate The Party Effect lets focus on 4 guests and see how they describe the stock market. Let’s look at guests 1, 10, 19 and 25. I picked these 4 because readers of this tale can relate in some form or another to one of these 4.

  • Guest 1 started 30 months ago, at the beginning of the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 12.28% for the entire 30-month cycle. He enjoyed the ride up for 18 months and now the ride down for the last 12.
  • Guest 10 started 21 months ago, halfway through the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 1.36%  for the 21-month period he has been invested.
  • Guest 19 started 12 months ago, at the beginning of the bear market phase, and his rate of return is  -21.53% for the 12-month period he has been invested.
  • Finally, Guest 25 started 6 months ago, halfway through the bear market phase, and his rate of return is  –11.42 for the 6-month period he has been invested.
These 4 guests experienced entirely different rate of return outcomes and view their portfolios and thus the stock market completely different. 
  • All 4 are correct. 
  • All 4 are right and yet they couldn’t possibly have more divergent outcomes. 
  • If they don’t have a complete picture of the stock market, they can get themselves in trouble. 
  • The difference between the best performing portfolio that is up 12.28% and the worst performing portfolio that is down 21.53% is an astounding 33.81%. 

Stock market investing will always produce different outcomes


Is this too obvious? You may say, of course they have different outcomes, they started at different times but that is not the point.  The point is that stock market investing will always produce different outcomes. 

  • One guest started at the worst time possible. 
  • Another guest started at the best possible time. 
  • How they look at the past determines how they see the present. 
  • Most importantly, it will determine how they will act going forward.


Pitfalls and dangers of the Party Effect or Recency Bias


The Party Effect simply states that stock market participants evaluate their portfolio performance based on their perspective and their perspective only. 

They do not see the market as it is but as they are. 

Without an expert understanding of how the stock market works, this leads to incorrect conclusions that ultimately lead to incorrect decisions. 


The field of Behavioral Finance (BF) has shown time and time again that people have variable risk profiles. BF demonstrates that fear is a stronger emotion than greed. 
  • This means that in our simple 4 guest example, Guests 3 and 4 are more likely to exit the stock market at just the wrong time since their recent, thus Recency Bias, experience is one of losing money. 
  • It means that Guest 1 and 2 are more likely to stay invested, thus catching the next wave up that is likely to follow. 


No one is immune to the Party Effect or Recency Bias


All 4 have intellectual access to the events of the last 30 months.  All 4 can educate themselves on the stock market. 
  • However, their particular situation is so biased by recent events that the facts are unimportant. They behave irrationally. 
  • I have witnessed this irrational behavior throughout my career. 
  • No one is immune, even advisors.


To overcome:  be an expert on the stock market yourself.


There are ways to combat The Party Effect trap but it is the deadliest of all the stock market traps that I know. Few can overcome it.  

The only sure way to overcome it is to
  • become an expert on the stock market yourself, 
  • learn to manage your emotions, and 
  • then either manage your own money or hire competent managers that you recognize are expert in their chosen investment discipline. 

However, if you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved the problem if you do not have expertise. Let me repeat this sentence and highlight it. If you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved The Party Effect trap if you do not have expertise yourself. 


When you hire an expert on the stock market without being an expert yourself all you have done is added complexity to a complex problem. 
  • You have inserted another variable between you and the stock market. 
  • You now have three variables to worry about, the stock market, your advisor and yourself. 
Without expertise you have no way of knowing if your advisor is an expert. You are in an endless loop. 
  • You are in a recursive situation. Just like we ask, what came first the chicken or the egg? 
  • The Party Effect asks, how do I hire an expert without being an expert myself?

If you are unwilling to become an expert on the stock market you must find a way to solve The Party Effect trap? 

Sunday 13 November 2016

Recency Bias or the Party Effect

Recency Bias or the Party Effect
Overview

The Party Effect or Recency Bias is where stock market participants evaluate their portfolio performance based on recent results or on their perspective of recent results and make incorrect conclusions that ultimately lead to incorrect decisions about how the stock market behaves. This is a very important concept to understand. Let’s set the stage for an illustration of how this happens.

Examples

A Party Tale

“You’re Right”

One of my favorite life lessons centers around President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, also known as FDR. FDR had many strengths but I think his greatest was his ability to recognize that things are not always black and white. I think his ability to see the big picture as well as discern the subtleties of a situation is what made him such an effective leader and brought out the best in others.

In one well known FDR story, he asks one of his trusted advisors what he thinks about a particular situation and after he listens to the advisor, FDR replies “You’re Right.” Not long after FDR asks another of his trusted advisors for his opinion on the same matter and this advisor gives the exact opposite recommendation from the first advisor to which FDR once again replies “You’re Right.”

At hearing FDR’s reply to the second advisor one of FDR’s closest advisors that had listened to FDR’s response to both advisors, points out the obvious contradiction to which FDR replies “You’re Also Right.”

Much can be learned from what at first appears to be FDR’s flippant and contradictory remarks to his advisors. However, FDR was far wiser. FDR understood that all three advisors were in fact right. They were just right from their perspective. But they didn’t have a view of the big picture. The contrast between FDR’s perspective of the entire situation compared to the trusted advisor’s perspective of a narrow part of the situation is what creates the dichotomy. The stock market works much the same way.

A different example would be the poem about the six blind men and the elephant. Each of the six blind men is asked to describe an elephant. Their perceptions lead to misinterpretation because they each describe the elephant differently depending on which part of the elephant they touch. One touches the side and describes the elephant like a wall. The other the tusk and describes the elephant as a spear. The next touches the trunk and describes a snake. The next the knee and describes a tree. The next an ear and describes a fan. Finally the last touches the tail and describes the elephant like a rope.

This tale is about the stock market and how investors relate to the stock market.The stock market can be viewed as FDR or the elephant while investors or participants in the stock market can be viewed as the advisors or the blind men.When describing the stock market each participant sees their portfolio’s performance from their perspective only and thus they are always “right” which leads to what I call The Party Effect or what Financial Behaviorist call the Recency Bias.

Imagine that you attended a party hosted by your investment advisor and that in addition to you, also in attendance were several other clients. As you go around the room and meet people you learn that everyone at the party owns the exact same S&P 500 index mutual fund. I use the S&P 500 for this tale because by many measures it has historically produce an average rate of return of about 12% and as many people know, and now you know as well, it represents what many investors call “the stock market.” The question then is would everyone have the same rate of return at this party? Of course the answer is, no they would not. If they started at the same time they would but since people invest or come into the life of the investment advisor at different times, the answer is no.

Let’s tighten up the party attendee list and invite only 30 guests. For simplicity, let’s assume that Guest 1 purchased the fund 30 months ago, that Guest 2 purchased it 29 months ago, that Guest 3 purchased it 28 months ago, etc. What would the guests discuss? What would be their perspectives of the stock market?


In order to determine what the guests would discuss and how they would evaluate their performance we need to have some data in the form of monthly rates of return. So we need to develop a monthly rate of return for 30 months to see what they see. Again, for simplicity, assume that for the first 18 months the fund goes up 3% per month and for the next 12 months it goes down 2% per month. Please note that I didn’t pick this sequence of numbers randomly. I have a purpose to this. This particular sequence approximates how the stock market moves in terms of bull and bear market duration and after 30 months returns approximately 12%; 12.28% to be exact. This sequence of numbers is a good sequence to illustrate The Party Effect or Recency Bias. We can characterize the first 18 months as the bull market phase of the 30-month cycle and the last 12 months as the bear market phase of the 30-month cycle.

To illustrate The Party Effect lets focus on 4 guests and see how they describe the stock market. Remember the FDR and elephant example from the start of this tale. Let’s look at guests 1, 10, 19 and 25. I picked these 4 because readers of this tale can relate in some form or another to one of these 4.

- Guest 1 started 30 months ago, at the beginning of the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 12.28% for the entire 30-month cycle. He enjoyed the ride up for 18 months and now the ride down for the last 12.

-  Guest 10 started 21 months ago, halfway through the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 1.36%    for the 21-month period he has been invested.

-  Guest 19 started 12 months ago, at the beginning of the bear market phase, and his rate of return is  -21.53% for the 12-month period he has been invested.

-  Finally, Guest 25 started 6 months ago, halfway through the bear market phase, and his rate of return is  –11.42 for the 6-month period he has been invested.

These 4 guests experienced entirely different rate of return outcomes and view their portfolios and thus the stock market completely different. All 4 are correct. All 4 are right and yet they couldn’t possibly have more divergent outcomes. If they don’t have a complete picture of the stock market, like the elephant, they can get themselves in trouble. The difference between the best performing portfolio that is up 12.28% and the worst performing portfolio that is down 21.53% is an astounding 33.81%. Is this too obvious? You may say, of course they have different outcomes, they started at different times but that is not the point. The point is that stock market investing will always produce different outcomes. One guest started at the worst time possible. Another guest started at the best possible time. How they look at the past determines how they see the present. Most importantly, it will determine how they will act going forward.

The Party Effect simply states that stock market participants evaluate their portfolio performance based on their perspective and their perspective only. They do not see the market as it is but as they are. Without an expert understanding of how the stock market works, this leads to incorrect conclusions that ultimately lead to incorrect decisions. The field of Behavioral Finance (BF) has shown time and time again that people have variable risk profiles. BF demonstrates that fear is a stronger emotion than greed. This means that in our simple 4 guest example, Guests 3 and 4 are more likely to exit the stock market at just the wrong time since their recent, thus Recency Bias, experience is one of losing money. It means that Guest 1 and 2 are more likely to stay invested, thus catching the next wave up that is likely to follow. All 4 have intellectual access to the events of the last 30 months. All 4 can educate themselves on the stock market. However, their particular situation is so biased by recent events that the facts are unimportant. They behave irrationally. I have witnessed this irrational behavior throughout my career. No one is immune, even advisors.

There are ways to combat The Party Effect trap but it is the deadliest of all the stock market traps that I know. Few can overcome it. The only sure way to overcome it is to become an expert on the stock market yourself, learn to manage your emotions, and then either manage your own money or hire competent managers that you recognize are expert in their chosen investment discipline. However, if you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved the problem if you do not have expertise. Let me repeat this sentence and highlight it. If you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved The Party Effect trap if you do not have expertise yourself. When you hire an expert on the stock market without being an expert yourself all you have done is added complexity to a complex problem. You have inserted another variable between you and the stock market. You now have three variables to worry about, the stock market, your advisor and yourself. Without expertise you have no way of knowing if your advisor is an expert. You are in an endless loop. You are in a recursive situation. Just like we ask, what came first the chicken or the egg? The Party Effect asks, how do I hire an expert without being an expert myself?

If you are unwilling to become an expert on the stock market you must find a way to solve The Party Effect trap? How do you do it? As a first step I suggest you read An Expert Tale to make sure the person you hire is in fact an expert and then hire them. The original intent of my Financial Tales project was to educate my kids and others I love. With that as a backdrop, this means I highly recommend you avoid dealing with any advisor that does not have a fiduciary relationship with you the client. Why, because you are adding a 4th variable to an already complex situation. You are adding the ever present conflict of interest that every non-fiduciary advisor has with their client. This 4th variable makes a successful outcome all but impossible. I recognize that these words are harsh but I believe your odds of success drop dramatically once you introduce the non-fiduciary variable. I don’t know what the future holds, but today you must avoid conflicted advisors at firms such as Merrill Lynch, Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley, etc. I expect that the non-fiduciary model of providing people with investment advice based on the size of the advertising budget will go the way of the dinosaur, but for as long as it exists, you must avoid this ilk of advisors.

What is the second step to avoiding The Party Effect trap? There is no second step. You either develop investment expertise or you learn to recognize experts and hire them. You can’t avoid or abdicate this charge. You must embrace your responsibility or you will suffer or those you love will suffer. It behooves the reader to invest their time in what is one of the most important decisions they will ever make and must make every day.



http://www.wikinvest.com/wiki/Recency_bias

Saturday 16 November 2013

Recency Bias or the Party Effect

Overview

The Party Effect or Recency Bias is where stock market participants evaluate their portfolio performance based on recent results or on their perspective of recent results and make incorrect conclusions that ultimately lead to incorrect decisions about how the stock market behaves. This is a very important concept to understand. Let’s set the stage for an illustration of how this happens.

Examples

A Party Tale

“You’re Right”

One of my favorite life lessons centers around President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, also known as FDR. FDR had many strengths but I think his greatest was his ability to recognize that things are not always black and white. I think his ability to see the big picture as well as discern the subtleties of a situation is what made him such an effective leader and brought out the best in others.

In one well known FDR story, he asks one of his trusted advisors what he thinks about a particular situation and after he listens to the advisor, FDR replies “You’re Right.” Not long after FDR asks another of his trusted advisors for his opinion on the same matter and this advisor gives the exact opposite recommendation from the first advisor to which FDR once again replies “You’re Right.”

At hearing FDR’s reply to the second advisor one of FDR’s closest advisors that had listened to FDR’s response to both advisors, points out the obvious contradiction to which FDR replies “You’re Also Right.”

Much can be learned from what at first appears to be FDR’s flippant and contradictory remarks to his advisors. However, FDR was far wiser. FDR understood that all three advisors were in fact right. They were just right from their perspective. But they didn’t have a view of the big picture. The contrast between FDR’s perspective of the entire situation compared to the trusted advisor’s perspective of a narrow part of the situation is what creates the dichotomy. The stock market works much the same way.

A different example would be the poem about the six blind men and the elephant. Each of the six blind men is asked to describe an elephant. Their perceptions lead to misinterpretation because they each describe the elephant differently depending on which part of the elephant they touch. One touches the side and describes the elephant like a wall. The other the tusk and describes the elephant as a spear. The next touches the trunk and describes a snake. The next the knee and describes a tree. The next an ear and describes a fan. Finally the last touches the tail and describes the elephant like a rope.

This tale is about the stock market and how investors relate to the stock market. The stock market can be viewed as FDR or the elephant while investors or participants in the stock market can be viewed as the advisors or the blind men. When describing the stock market each participant sees their portfolio’s performance from their perspective only and thus they are always “right” which leads to what I call The Party Effect or what Financial Behaviorist call the Recency Bias.

Imagine that you attended a party hosted by your investment advisor and that in addition to you, also in attendance were several other clients. As you go around the room and meet people you learn that everyone at the party owns the exact same S&P 500 index mutual fund. I use the S&P 500 for this tale because by many measures it has historically produce an average rate of return of about 12% and as many people know, and now you know as well, it represents what many investors call “the stock market.” The question then is would everyone have the same rate of return at this party? Of course the answer is, no they would not. If they started at the same time they would but since people invest or come into the life of the investment advisor at different times, the answer is no.

Let’s tighten up the party attendee list and invite only 30 guests. For simplicity, let’s assume that Guest 1 purchased the fund 30 months ago, that Guest 2 purchased it 29 months ago, that Guest 3 purchased it 28 months ago, etc. What would the guests discuss? What would be their perspectives of the stock market?


In order to determine what the guests would discuss and how they would evaluate their performance we need to have some data in the form of monthly rates of return. So we need to develop a monthly rate of return for 30 months to see what they see. Again, for simplicity, assume that for the first 18 months the fund goes up 3% per month and for the next 12 months it goes down 2% per month. Please note that I didn’t pick this sequence of numbers randomly. I have a purpose to this. This particular sequence approximates how the stock market moves in terms of bull and bear market duration and after 30 months returns approximately 12%; 12.28% to be exact. This sequence of numbers is a good sequence to illustrate The Party Effect or Recency Bias. We can characterize the first 18 months as the bull market phase of the 30-month cycle and the last 12 months as the bear market phase of the 30-month cycle.

To illustrate The Party Effect lets focus on 4 guests and see how they describe the stock market. Remember the FDR and elephant example from the start of this tale. Let’s look at guests 1, 10, 19 and 25. I picked these 4 because readers of this tale can relate in some form or another to one of these 4.

- Guest 1 started 30 months ago, at the beginning of the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 12.28% for the entire 30-month cycle. He enjoyed the ride up for 18 months and now the ride down for the last 12.

-  Guest 10 started 21 months ago, halfway through the bull market phase, and his rate of return is 1.36%    for the 21-month period he has been invested.

-  Guest 19 started 12 months ago, at the beginning of the bear market phase, and his rate of return is             -21.53% for the 12-month period he has been invested.

-  Finally, Guest 25 started 6 months ago, halfway through the bear market phase, and his rate of return is
    –11.42 for the 6-month period he has been invested.

These 4 guests experienced entirely different rate of return outcomes and view their portfolios and thus the stock market completely different. All 4 are correct. All 4 are right and yet they couldn’t possibly have more divergent outcomes. If they don’t have a complete picture of the stock market, like the elephant, they can get themselves in trouble. The difference between the best performing portfolio that is up 12.28% and the worst performing portfolio that is down 21.53% is an astounding 33.81%. Is this too obvious? You may say, of course they have different outcomes, they started at different times but that is not the point. The point is that stock market investing will always produce different outcomes. One guest started at the worst time possible. Another guest started at the best possible time. How they look at the past determines how they see the present. Most importantly, it will determine how they will act going forward.

The Party Effect simply states that stock market participants evaluate their portfolio performance based on their perspective and their perspective only. They do not see the market as it is but as they are. Without an expert understanding of how the stock market works, this leads to incorrect conclusions that ultimately lead to incorrect decisions. The field of Behavioral Finance (BF) has shown time and time again that people have variable risk profiles. BF demonstrates that fear is a stronger emotion than greed. This means that in our simple 4 guest example, Guests 3 and 4 are more likely to exit the stock market at just the wrong time since their recent, thus Recency Bias, experience is one of losing money. It means that Guest 1 and 2 are more likely to stay invested, thus catching the next wave up that is likely to follow. All 4 have intellectual access to the events of the last 30 months. All 4 can educate themselves on the stock market. However, their particular situation is so biased by recent events that the facts are unimportant. They behave irrationally. I have witnessed this irrational behavior throughout my career. No one is immune, even advisors.

There are ways to combat The Party Effect trap but it is the deadliest of all the stock market traps that I know. Few can overcome it. The only sure way to overcome it is to become an expert on the stock market yourself, learn to manage your emotions, and then either manage your own money or hire competent managers that you recognize are expert in their chosen investment discipline. However, if you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved the problem if you do not have expertise. Let me repeat this sentence and highlight it. If you hire an expert on the stock market you have not solved The Party Effect trap if you do not have expertise yourself. When you hire an expert on the stock market without being an expert yourself all you have done is added complexity to a complex problem. You have inserted another variable between you and the stock market. You now have three variables to worry about, the stock market, your advisor and yourself. Without expertise you have no way of knowing if your advisor is an expert. You are in an endless loop. You are in a recursive situation. Just like we ask, what came first the chicken or the egg? The Party Effect asks, how do I hire an expert without being an expert myself?

If you are unwilling to become an expert on the stock market you must find a way to solve The Party Effect trap? How do you do it? As a first step I suggest you read An Expert Tale to make sure the person you hire is in fact an expert and then hire them. The original intent of my Financial Tales project was to educate my kids and others I love. With that as a backdrop, this means I highly recommend you avoid dealing with any advisor that does not have a fiduciary relationship with you the client. Why, because you are adding a 4th variable to an already complex situation. You are adding the ever present conflict of interest that every non-fiduciary advisor has with their client. This 4th variable makes a successful outcome all but impossible. I recognize that these words are harsh but I believe your odds of success drop dramatically once you introduce the non-fiduciary variable. I don’t know what the future holds, but today you must avoid conflicted advisors at firms such as Merrill Lynch, Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley, etc. I expect that the non-fiduciary model of providing people with investment advice based on the size of the advertising budget will go the way of the dinosaur, but for as long as it exists, you must avoid this ilk of advisors.

What is the second step to avoiding The Party Effect trap? There is no second step. You either develop investment expertise or you learn to recognize experts and hire them. You can’t avoid or abdicate this charge. You must embrace your responsibility or you will suffer or those you love will suffer. It behooves the reader to invest their time in what is one of the most important decisions they will ever make and must make every day.



http://www.wikinvest.com/wiki/Recency_bias

Saturday 17 August 2013

New information is interpreted, and not all of that interpretation is rational. (Behavioral Finance)

Psychological research in behavioural finance dispute the idea that investors act as dispassionate calculating machines.

It turns out that like everyone else, investors respond to events in the world with certain powerful biases.  

New information is interpreted, not simply digested, and not all of that interpretation is rational.

One powerful set of biases tends to give more significance to the most recent news, good or bad, than is actually warranted.  The stocks of companies that report high rates of growth are driven to extremes, as are stocks of companies that disappoint.  (Recency bias).

These findings about excessive reactions confirm a belief that value investors have held since Graham:  Over the long run, performance of both companies and share prices generally reverts to a mean.

"Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that now are in honor."

Friday 5 October 2012

Cognitive Biases That Cause Bad Investment Decisions


Henry Stimpson
Published: Tuesday, November 29th 2011


When it comes to investing, you might think your emotions don’t play a role, but they do without you even realizing it. Everyone has emotional and cognitive biases that shape their choices, and only by spotting them can you overcome them so they don’t cause bad investment decisions, according to Ben Sullivan, a certified financial planner at Palisades Hudson Financial Group.
Sullivan recalls a number of clients who have made mistakes in the past. A middle-aged banker had more than half of his $500,000 portfolio in a few bank stocks. Another prospective client sold his business to a big consumer-goods company had almost all his money — many millions — in that company’s stock. An employee believed his 401(k) plan was diversified because he owned four funds — all large-cap stock funds.
“Investor mistakes have predictable patterns,” says Sullivan. “Our pervasive emotional and cognitive biases often lead to poor decisions.”

Overconfidence
It’s easy to overestimate your own abilities in picking stocks while underestimating risks. Even professional money managers struggle to beat index funds. The casual investor has little chance, Sullivan says.
“It’s almost impossible to have a day job and moonlight as manager of your individual-stocks portfolio,” he says. “Overconfidence frequently leaves investors with their eggs in far too few baskets, with those baskets dangerously close to one another.”

Self-attribution
T
his is a cognitive error leading to overconfidence. Someone who bought both Pets.com and Apple in 1999 might dismiss his Pets.com loss (it went bankrupt) because the market tanked but believe he’s an investment whiz because he bought Apple.

Familiarity
Investing in what you “know best” can be a siren song leading investors astray from a prudently diversified portfolio. That was the case with all three investors mentioned above. They were familiar with banks, consumer goods and large-cap U.S. stocks respectively, Sullivan says, and unwisely put all their eggs in that familiar basket.

Anchoring and loss aversion

Investors may become “anchored” to the original purchase price. Someone who paid $1 million for his home in 2007 may insist that what he paid is the home’s true value, even though it’s really worth $700,000 now. The same holds for securities.
“Only the future potential risk and return of an investment matter,” Sullivan says.
Inability to sell a bad investment and take a loss causes investors to lose more money as the hoped-for recovery never happens.
“You’ll also miss the opportunity to capture tax benefits by selling and taking a capital loss,” he adds.


Herd fever
When the market is hot and high, the media and everyone else say buy. When prices are low — remember March 2009 — everyone says sell. Following the herd leads investors to come late to the party so that they’re buying at the top and selling at the bottom. Following the herd is a powerful emotion.
Today, Sullivan says, the herd is buying gold and U.S. Treasuries.

Recency
According to a study by DALBAR Inc., the average investor’s returns lagged those of the S&P 500 index by 6.5% per year for the 20 years prior to 2008 largely because of recency bias. People invested in last year’s hot funds, which often turn sour next year, instead of taking a steady course, he says.
(Ed: Read about how the recency effect has been influencing the housing market.)


Counteracting your biases

Having a written plan is the key, Sullivan says.
“Create a plan and stick to it,” he says.
Hewing to a written long-term investment policy prevents you from making haphazard decisions about your portfolios during times of economic stress or euphoria. Selecting the appropriate asset allocation will help you weather turbulent markets.
All investors should invest assets they will need to withdraw from their portfolios within five years in short-term liquid investments. Combining an appropriate asset with a short-term reserve gives investors more confidence to stick to their long-term plans, he says.
If you can’t control your emotions — or don’t have the time or skill to manage your investments — consider hiring a fee-only financial adviser, Sullivan says. An adviser can provide moral support and coaching, which will boost your confidence in your long-term plan and also prevent you from making a bad, emotionally driven decision.
“We all bring our natural biases into the investment process,” Sullivan says. “Though we cannot eliminate these biases, we can recognize them and respond in ways that help us avoid destructive and self-defeating behavior.”

Thursday 26 April 2012

The Genetics of Investing


Are you one of the better investors?  The answer might lie in your genes.
Investors frequently fall prey to a myriad of asset-damaging biases, such as engaging in excess trading, being inadequately diversified or thinking that recent success proves you’re a genius unconstrained by the normal rules of sound financial management.
A recent academic paper titled “Why Do Individuals Exhibit Investment Biases?” by finance professors Henrik Cronqvist and Stephan Siegel argues that around 50% of the variation of biases among people comes from their genes.  What this means is that if you try to explain why some people make certain kinds of financial mistakes, about half of your explanation should point to genetics and the other half to environmental differences.
A key implication of the authors’ analysis is that you can’t trust your intuition with regard to investments because your genes probably push you to make irrational choices.  When deciding how to invest, consequently, you should be open to going against what feels right in favor of following sound investment advice such as buy and hold, diversify and don’t mistake luck for financial acumen.
The really interesting implications of this genetic analysis, however, won’t kick in until a lot more people get their genes sequenced.  The cost of digitally transcribing someone’s DNA is exponentially dropping.  It’s reasonable to predict that within 10 years, most everyone in rich countries will for health reasons have their DNA analyzed; after all, if your genes make you susceptible to a certain kind of cancer, you really want to know this so that you can get yourself tested.  But once you know your DNA and understand the genes that cause specific biases, you could learn exactly what kind of investment problems your genes predispose you to.
Parents could use information gleaned from their children’s DNA to figure out what kind of financial lessons to give their offspring, and to in part determine which of their children should have power of attorney over them if they become medically incapable of making financial decisions.

Tuesday 3 November 2009

Investors suffer from recency bias

Investors suffer from recency bias
Written by Ang Kok Heng
Monday, 02 November 2009 10:36

Human beings suffer from various forms of psychological biases (see Table 1). One of them is recency bias. Recency bias is a kind of mental myopia where investors focus on the more recent events, that is giving more weight to the recent happenings. Like many other diseases where there is no known cure, there is also no known financial doctor who can heal this mental myopia as it is hereditary.

Everyone, irrespective of race or level of education achieved, suffers from this problem, the only difference is the degree. In the absence of a cure, the only advice is for one to understand the cause of the disease, and learn how to control it so that we can reduce incidents of bad decision, while at the same time make more sensible investment decisions.


Short memory
As humans tend to have short memories, events that happened months or years ago tend to be neglected. Instead, recent incidents that are of lesser importance are still fresh in the memory. These incidents have a strong impact on our day-to-day judgement as they interfere in the decision-making process and influence our decision on a particular assessment.

Unlike the memory of a computer where every file is kept according to the names, the human mind arranges the “files” according to time and relative importance. Recent affairs are fresh in the memory. Some of the more important events are also kept at the top of our mind, but trivial events are suppressed to the bottom so as to release more room for the brain to remember relatively more important happenings (see Chart 1).

Some of the very important occurrences that happened recently will always be at the top of our mind. As a result, our brain will always remind us of other recent events, especially those which are more important. From time to time, our brain will also recall some of the more important happenings that occurred many years ago. There is also a tendency for old information to be out-weighed by new information, even though both are of equal importance.

All these “reminders” that pop up during our decision-making process influence our judgement sub-consciously.






Narrow framing
Another problem of recency bias is short-term bias. Many people are focused on the immediate future and are not too interested in the broader perspective. This phenomenon is sometimes called “narrow framing”, as it distorts our perception to the point that we do not think rationally. It changes the way we think, the way we analyse an issue. This framing bias gives a selective simplistic picture of reality.

Narrow framing is seen in emphasis by analysts to focus on quarterly results. A company which performs poorly in the latest quarter tends to be downgraded by analysts as if the poor showing is sure to be continued over the next few quarters. A more detailed analysis is needed to determine whether a particular below-average result is due to a luck factor, events beyond the control of the management, cyclical nature, change in circumstances, etc.

Unfortunately, most analysts and fund managers place undue emphasis on the belief that what has just happened to a company will continue to happen. As analysing quarterly results is the job of analysts, they tend to be over-excited by short-term changes of earnings, and they have the tendency to exaggerate transient changes.

There is no denying that the poor results of some companies signal the beginning of their downturn. Unless there is clear evidence to show that a drastic fundamental change has occurred, it would be too simplistic to assume that every company having a weaker quarterly profit will continue to go down.


Emphasis on recent trends
A study by Kahneman and Tversky in 1973 found that people usually assume there is a strong correlation between the recent past and future outcomes.

Investors believe recent trends can predict future market directions. Assume the market goes up five times and down five times. The different orders of the up-market (U) and down-market (D) will influence investors’ perception differently. If the market is directionless (as in Chart 2a), investors will not be able to decide where the market is heading. But if the market forms an obvious downtrend recently (Chart 2b), fear of a further downturn will make investors bearish for the immediate outlook. However, if the market has been trending upwards recently (Chart 2c), there is a tendency that investors will believe the market will continue to go up.

In all three examples, the market comes back to the original level. Investor (a) is at a loss. Investor (b) feels like selling to preserve the capital after the initial market run-up. Investor (c) is hopeful that the market is recovering again after the initial losses.

This type of psychology is also seen in punters who play roulette in a casino on the belief that recent results will form a pattern. In fact, each outcome is independent of previous outcomes. Similarly, a series of heads from tossing a coin will not show nor give you the ability to predict the exact outcome of the next toss, whether it is a head or a tail.

In predicting the outcome of market direction the next day, the past few days’ performance will not be sufficient to predict the market direction correctly. If there is any correlation, the degree of accuracy using the past few days’ performance to predict the next few days’ direction is only marginally relevant.


More weight on recent events
Given a list of items, most people tend to recall the items at the end of a list rather than items in the middle. This type of human weakness in recency bias is exploited in many instances.

For example, lawyers schedule the more “influential” witness at the end of the witness appearance in court to influence the judge or jury; event managers schedule a list of speakers to achieve the desired results at the beginning or end of an event; personnel managers emphasise the recent conduct of an employee to judge the performance of the employee, etc.

There is a tendency for an investor to focus on “what happened lately” while making a decision. This recency bias puts more weight on recent events rather than looking at the longer period of evaluation. An investment for a longer period of three to five years should not be evaluated based solely on the past six months’ events and ignore the happenings of the past few years.


Reinforced by frequency
Recent happenings can also be reinforced by the frequency of news heard or read. Investors are biased by the frequency of news received. A piece of news repeated many times is lodged more deeply in the mind than one that is broadcast only once. The more times an investor hears or reads about a particular piece of news, the more likely he or she will react to the outcome of the news. This is because repetition distorts our belief that a particular event is more important.

Unfortunately, the media likes to repeat and sensationalise a particular type of news, especially negative ones. This type of biased reporting will only mislead investors into making prejudiced decisions. In the recent crisis, the negative comments and fear of recurrence of a 1930s-style depression were repeatedly broadcast by both the electronic and print media, and it swayed many into believing that another depression was imminent.

Other than distortion by frequency of news, breaking news that highlights a particular incident — usually negative — will also increase the bearish opinion of investors as if such a mishap would happen again soon. Getting influenced by such reporting does not help investors in rational thinking.


Recency leads to overconfidence
A series of recent successes may also lead to overconfidence in investors, as if nothing could possibly go wrong. The years upon years of success of LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) in managing a client’s money misled fund managers into believing that their strategies were perfect. In order to make more money, they increased their leverage and bet heavily on Russian bonds. The unexpected collapse of the Russian economy resulted in huge losses that led to the subsequent downfall of the invincible LTCM in 1998.

The Internet stock rally of the early 2000s is also a good example of how the daily gains in the “new economy” dot.com stocks misled investors into believing that the momentum would continue, and that these hot stocks will just keep rallying.

We all fall prey to recency bias, whether you are a professional fund manager or an individual retail investor. There is a strong tendency to believe in our hearts that whatever happens recently is going to continue. As such, a bull market enhances market confidence, and a bear market depresses the mood of investors. Unknown to many, the changes in our emotions are dictating our actions, which rationally should be determined by the real fundamentals.


Distancing from recent losers
The recent global financial crisis resulted in losses in almost every asset class, and many investors cut their losses and regretted having invested in those assets. Losses were seen in every bourse. Institutions and high net-worth individuals redeemed their investments from hedge funds.

Unit trust investors avoided high-risk equity funds and opted for guaranteed structured products. Bond investors also saw losses due to a perceived increase in credit risk. Bond investors avoided lower grade bonds in favour of AAA and government bonds. Even low-risk money market funds were faced with massive redemptions early this year, as investors were fearful of possible bank failures. All these have passed ,and investors now are more rational as the economy is obviously recovering gradually.


Following recent performers
The exit from market losers benefited the strong performing asset classes — one of which is gold, which has performed well after the financial crisis. It is common for investors to avoid recent, poorer-performing investments and chase after stronger performers. Investors believe that those investments which have performed well recently will continue to do well.

This recency bias influenced many unit trust investors to put in more investment during the bull market when funds were showing strong gains. Similarly, during the bear market, unit trust investors were avoiding this investment for fear of further losses. Instead of buying low and selling high, unfortunately, unit trust investors always fall prey to recency bias and perform the opposite. Similar mistakes were also made in other forms of investment where investors chase after strong performers.

Unknowingly, the psychological weakness of investors cause many investors to adopt the wrong investment approach. What investors need to do is diagnose the degree of recency bias they suffered, and how to control such deficiency.


Ang has 20 years’ experience in research and investment. He is currently the chief investment officer of Phillip Capital Management Sdn Bhd.


This article appeared in The Edge Financial Daily, November 2, 2009.

http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/business-news/152639-investors-suffer-from-recency-bias.html